



CS 6846: Quantum Algorithms and Cryptography

Lec 7: Basics of Cryptography

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Cryptography



- A mathematical science of controlling access to *information*
- Cryptography deals with methods for protecting the *privacy and integrity* while *preserving functionality* of computer and communication systems.


What would we like to achieve?



Examples

#1 : Secure Elections

Multi-party computation!



CORRECT : Winner determined correctly

SECURITY : individual vote privacy maintained

#2 : Protecting your code

I know a better algorithm to factor numbers!



code

O
B
F
U
S
C
A
T
O
R

Program Obfuscation!

Obfuscated code

```
#include<stdio.h> #include<string.h>
main(){char*0,1[999]=""'acgo\177"|xp .
-\OR^8)NJ6%K40+A2M(*0ID57$3G1FBL";
while(0=fgets(1+45,954,stdin)){*1=0[
strlen(0)[0-1]=0,strcmp(0,1+11)];
while(*0)switch(((*1&&isalnum(*0))-!*1)
{case-1:{char*I=(0+=strcmp(0,1+12)
+1)-2,0=34;while(*I&3&&(0=(0-16<<1)+
*I---')<80);putchar(D&93?*I
&8|!( I=memchr( 1 , 0 , 44 ) ) ???:
I-1+47:32); break; case 1: ;}*1=
(*0&31)[1-15+(*0>61)*32];while(putchar
(45+*1/2),( *1=*1+32>>1)>35); case 0:
putchar(++0 ,32));};putchar(10);}
```

- Produces correct output
- Impossible to reverse engineer

#3 : Activism with safety

How Iran's political battle is fought in cyberspace



International media were banned from reporting on protests in Iran, so activists on Twitter filed the gap.

Iran's Basij Sisters suppressed election protests

Wednesday, 05 August 2009



Probabilistic algorithm



$C = \text{Encrypt}(\text{"The election was rigged"}, R)$

R, R' :
Random bits

Under coercion, reveal R' s.t. $C = (\text{"Really like to cook"}, R')$

Deniable Encryption!

#4: Computing on encrypted data



- ❖ Users access data and infrastructure on-the-go
- ❖ Cloud stores data about you, me and many more
- ❖ I should only learn information I am authorized to learn

Encrypted Computation Personalised Medicine

“The dream for tomorrow’s medicine is to understand the links between DNA and disease — and to tailor therapies accordingly. But scientists have a problem: how to keep genetic data and medical records secure while still enabling the **massive, cloud-based analyses** needed to make meaningful associations.”

Check Hayden, E. (2015). *Nature*, 519, 400-401.




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“You don’t look anything like the long haired, skinny kid I married 25 years ago. I need a DNA sample to make sure it’s still you.”

Can Cryptography solve this?

Public Key Encryption




PKE does not suffice!

- Secret keys correspond to users
- Encrypt for each user?
- All or nothing access
 - Genomic data (for instance) is too sensitive to share
 - May be willing to participate in study which reveals output (result of study) without revealing input (personal data)

More Expressive Encryption

Functional Encryption!



Decryption recovers $F(x)$

F : Age distribution of people with lung cancer


X : particular user's disease profile

Encryption with Partial Decryption Keys

Encrypt (x):



Decrypt (sk_F , ct):



Keygen(F):



Security:


Adversary possessing keys for multiple circuits F_i cannot distinguish $\text{Enc}(x_0)$ from $\text{Enc}(x_1)$ unless $F_i(x_0) \neq F_i(x_1)$

Functional Encryption [SW05,BSW11]

Personalized Medicine?

Encrypt

input = genomic data of users




Keygen

input: some medical research algo



Decrypt (sk_F, ct):




Security: No one's personal genomic data is leaked!


Functional Encryption [SW05,BSW11]

Spam Detection on Encrypted Email

Say we have a program P to detect spam on unencrypted email.



#5: Fully Homomorphic Encryption



Expressive
Functionality:
Supports
arbitrary circuits

Compact
ciphertext,
independent of
circuit size

Perfect:
Encrypted
computation with
All or Nothing
Decryption

* : up to minor variations

#6: Traitor Tracing





I'll buy one license
And use it to forge
and sell new
licenses ...

Can we catch him ?

#6: Traitor Tracing


- N users in system, One PK, N SKs
- Anyone can encrypt, only legitimate user should decrypt
- If collusion of traitors create new secret key SK^* , can trace at least one guilty traitor.




#7: Bitcoins



- Bitcoins uses **cryptography** to authenticate transactions, prevent theft and double spending, incentivize honest behaviour (we'll see how).
- It is underpinned by a **peer to peer network** made up of its users machines, akin to the networks that underpin BitTorrent and Skype.



#8: Broadcast Encryption



All users in the system
(# of users = N)


Broadcast Encryption

Trivial solution:

Encrypt message to each user using PKE.

$O(N)$ ciphertext!

⇒ **Shorter ciphertext** possible?



Confusion
resistance

All users in the system
(# of users = N)

#9: Zero Knowledge

- How do you prove you know something without revealing what you know?
- When you write exams, you prove to the instructor that you know a solution by writing down the solution
- Suppose you want to sell an idea but want to reveal the idea *after* you get the money?

Sudoku

8			4	6			7
						4	
	1					6	5
5		9		3		7	8
				7			
	4	8		2		1	3
	5	2					9
		1					
3			9	2			5

Fill in the grid so that :

- Every row has digits 1-9
- Every column has digits 1-9
- Every cube has digits 1-9


Zero Knowledge proof

- I want to convince my friend that I know the solution to the Sudoku puzzle without telling him the solution
- Lets be a bit formal. We have two players : a prover and a verifier
- Our tool will be packs of cards

Step 1

- Draw the 9 by 9 grid and place cards face-up on it

Step 1



Step 2

- Prover places cards corresponding to her solution face down.
- She places three identical valued cards face down



Step 3

- Verifier starts making packets one for each column
- From each cell in the column one of three cards is chosen at **random**
- Similarly verifier makes packets for rows
- Lastly, verifier makes packets for subgrids

Step 4

- Prover turns over the cards which are facing up in each packet and shuffles them.
- Verifier opens each packet to see that all 9 values occur in each packet

- Can the prover cheat?
- If so, with what probability of success?
- Does the verifier learn anything about the solution?

#10: Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]



File 1



File 2




File 3




Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]



Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]




Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]


Encrypted with **same** PK
but **different** "policies"





File 1



File 2



File 3



SK_{Prof}

"Role:
Professor"
"Dept: CS"
"Affiliation:
IITM"
"DOJ: 01/01/95"


Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]



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File 1




File 2



SK_{Stud}



File 3



"Role: Student"
"Dept: EE"
"Affiliation:
IITM"
"DOJ: 14/07/15"


Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]



Encrypted with **same** PK
but **different** "policies"




File 1



File 2



File 3



SK_{Admin}

"Role: Admin"
"Dept: Acad"
"Affiliation:
IITM"
"DOJ: 28/02/14"

Attribute based Encryption

[SW05, GPSW06]

